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This paper estimates the employment effects of the Swedish trainee replacement 
schemes  (an active labour market program that was in operation during the 1990s). The 
empirical analysis exploits a large and rich administrative data set, and we control for 
observed and unobserved selection bias by using a multiple equation model and the 
maximum likelihood estimation method. The estimation results point at a selection of 
participants having a high ex ante probability of employment. In addition, the results 
suggest that participation in replacement schemes increased the re-employment 
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In the early 1990s the Swedish economy experienced a serious slump, and the 
unemployment figures rose drastically. This development paved the way for a massive 
expansion of active labour market policies (ALMPs) in order to enhance the chances of 
the unemployed1 to return to regular employment. In 1994, approximately 5 percent of 
the labour force (more than 200,000 individuals) was engaged in different labour market 
programmes, whereas open unemployment approached two-digit levels. 
  A number of new ALMPs were launched during the 1990s. One such policy was 
the so-called trainee replacement schemes. By subsidising training costs for employed 
workers as well as the cost associated with employing a substitute, the idea was to 
provide an opportunity for employers to enhance the skills of their employees and, at the 
same time, create temporary jobs for unemployed individuals. On the surface these 
temporary jobs appear to have been relatively successful; a survey conducted by the 
National Labour Market Board suggests that individuals who participated in 
replacement schemes in 1996 experienced higher re-employment rates than participants 
in other labour market programmes (except for recruitment subsidies).2 
  The difficulty in evaluating programmes lies in the fact that we do not know how 
well participants would have performed had they not participated in the programme. The 
purpose of this paper is to study the employment effects of the temporary jobs that were 
created as part of the replacement schemes. Specifically, did the programme have a 
positive effect on individuals’ re-employment probabilities? Or, were the favourable re-
employment rates mainly the result of a selection of participants having a high ex ante 
probability of employment? The empirical analysis exploits non-experimental data from 
the HÄNDEL database, which is administered by the National Labour Market Board. 
We control for observed and unobserved selection bias by using a multiple equation 
model and the maximum likelihood estimation method. By allowing for heterogeneity in 
                                                 
1 In this paper “unemployed” means “registered at a local unemployment office”. An unemployed person may be 
openly unemployed, or participate in some policy programme.    
2 AMS (1999) p. 28. The survey asks for the employment status in late 1997 for individuals who finished a 
programme spell during the last quarter of 1996. The re-employment rate for those who had participated in trainee 
replacement schemes was 53.6 percent. For participants in labour market training, work experience schemes (ALU) 




the estimated programme effects, the paper will also analyse whether certain types of 
individuals stand a better chance than others to benefit from participation.3   
   Previous studies of Swedish ALMPs during the 1990s have in general found very 
modest, or even negative, effects of policy programmes on participants’ labour market 
outcomes.4 Ackum Agell (1995) found that participants in trainee replacement schemes 
were more likely to go from the programme to a permanent job than participants in other 
ALMPs (relief work, labour market training and work experience schemes). The study 
most comparable to the present one is AMS (1999). Using a methodology similar to the 
one adopted here, the study set out to compare wage and employment outcomes for 
various Swedish ALMPs. The results suggested that recruitment subsidies and 
replacement schemes were the most favourable ALMPs in terms of increased 
employment probabilities. 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives some 
empirical background. The econometric model and the data are introduced in Sections 3 
and 4. Estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. TRAINEE REPLACEMENT SCHEMES 
Trainee replacement schemes were introduced in September 1991. The idea was to 
create temporary jobs for unemployed individuals and, at the same time, provide an 
opportunity for the already employed to enhance their skills. Briefly, by subsidising 
training costs for employed workers as well as the cost associated with employing a 
substitute, the employer was expected to have an unemployed individual replace the 
worker who was on leave for education. Thus, in contrast to many other ALMPs, 
                                                 
3 Since public programmes generally affect non-participants as well (e.g. through taxes, wages and displacement 
effects), the effects on participants’ future labour market prospects only provide partial information on total 
programme effects. The general equilibrium implications are however not the subject of the present study. A recent 
study on displacement effects of ALMPs in Sweden is Dahlberg & Forslund (1999), who find that there are 
substantial direct displacement effects from those ALMPs that generate subsidised labour. 
4 See e.g. SOU (1993), Regnér (1997), AMS (1999) and Larsson (2000) for evaluations of relief work, labour market 
training, youth practice and work experience schemes. Similarly, Martin (1998) shows that most OECD countries 
have experienced very limited (if any) positive effects of large-scale policy programmes. For a survey of Swedish 




participants in replacement schemes were expected to perform another individual’s 
regular duties.5  
The participants were selected from among potential candidates by the local 
employment office. To be qualified for a temporary replacement job, the unemployed 
person had to be at least 20 years of age. In addition to the formal age restriction, the 
unemployed individual presumably had to meet certain standards set by the 
employer/organiser. Consequently, that the assignment of programme participants was 
random, or done on a roughly first-come, first-serve basis, seems highly unlikely.  
The substitute was paid according to the collective agreement at the work place 
where the replacement scheme took place. The employer was allowed to deduct from 
the payroll tax approximately SEK 450 per day6 to cover the labour cost associated with 
employing the substitute. Moreover, training costs for the employee on leave for 
education were deductible from the payroll tax up to an amount of SEK 20,000.  
The vast majority of trainee replacement schemes took place in the public sector.7 
This can probably be attributed to the fact that temporary jobs, and the use of 
substitutes, are more common in the public sector than in the private sector. In terms of 
the scale of the programme, replacement schemes never became a particularly important 
ALMP. Instead, the massive expansion of programme participation during the 1990s 
occurred in other programmes, such as the more low-budget oriented work experience 
schemes (ALU). Table 1 shows the number of participants (yearly averages) in selected 
ALMPs between 1992 and 1997. Replacement schemes were expanded until 1994 when 
participation approached (on average) 12,700 individuals, or slightly more than 5 
percent of total programme participation. Presumably due to a cut in employer benefits 
(see footnote 6), the number of individuals in replacement schemes declined sharply in 
1997. In December 1997, about six years after the introduction, replacement schemes as 
described in this section were finally cancelled.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Individuals in, for example, work experience schemes and relief work were not intended to perform tasks that 
comprised the normal activities of the organiser. 
6 The programme period was limited to six months, but it could be extended to another six months’ period. The tax-
deductible amount was SEK 475 in 1994, but was lowered to SEK 400 in 1996 and SEK 350 in 1997.  





Table 1. Participants in labour market training (AMU), work experience 
schemes (ALU) and trainee replacement schemes (TRS) 1992-1997 
(yearly averages, 1000’s).  
year   AMU  ALU   TRS    total 
1992   86.3   -   8.3   162.4 
1993   53.1   35.1   9.7   191.3 
1994   59.5   44.5   12.7   233.3 
1995   54.6   41.3   11.2   197.9 
1996   45.6   52.4   9.8   201.9 
1997   35.8   52.5   3.6   190.1 
Source: The National Labour Market Board. 
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
3.1 The evaluation problem 
Success criterion, programme effects and response periods 
Active labour market programmes are supposed to have a positive effect on the future 
labour market prospects of unemployed workers. The probability of getting a job and 
keeping it may increase. Participation may decrease the duration of unemployment 
periods. The probability of getting a better-paid job may increase. In the present study 
we concentrate on the employment effects, primarily because the main purpose of the 
trainee replacement schemes was to increase employability. In our empirical analysis we 
use employment in a non-subsidised job as the success criterion. 
  The counterfactual, or benchmark state, of interest to this paper is the state of the 
world had replacement schemes not been in operation. Then, the effect of the 
programme could, broadly defined, be thought of as the difference between participants’ 
observed outcome (e.g. the employment status some time after the programme finished) 
and the outcome had they not participated but continued searching for a job. Allowing 
the hypothetical non-participation state to run from the onset of the programme, the 
effect would reflect the joint influence of two separate components. Firstly, the time 
constraint suggests that, while participating in the programme, individuals presumably 
have less time for job-searching activities, i.e., a “lock-in” effect. Secondly, 
participation might have the hoped-for effect of improving individuals’ future labour 




existence of both effects, the present study will focus mainly on the human capital 
aspects of participation. 
Empirical evidence suggests that search activity may diminish considerably during 
the programme period (see e.g. Edin & Holmlund (1991) or Ackum Agell (1996)). In 
particular, Ackum Agell (1996) reports that participants in replacement schemes 
virtually cancelled all search activities. Building on this result, the present study adopts 
the approximation that participants stopped searching for a job during the programme 
period. The human capital effect of participating may then be identified by having the 
hypothetical non-participation state run from the end rather than the start of the 
programme. 
The time span between the programme end and the date at which the outcome 
variable is observed will be referred to as the response period. When assessing the 
impact of a programme, the empirical analyst frequently relies on survey data collected 
some time after the programme finished. By asking respondents about the state of the 
outcome variable(s) at a particular date, for example one year after the programme end, 
the subsequent evaluation has to settle with one distinct response period. By contrast, 
the register data used in this paper (described in Section 4 below) contain continuous 
updates of individuals’ labour market outcomes, which makes it possible to select 
response periods of varying lengths. In the empirical application we let the response 
periods vary from 3 months up to 18 months in order to study both short and long-term 
effects of participating in the programme.  
 
Non-experimental data and selection bias 
The difficulty in evaluating policy programmes is that we do not observe single 
individuals in both states at the same time, as participants and non-participants. We thus 
have a serious identification problem due to “missing” data. The usual remedy is to use 
the outcome of non-participants (the control group) to proxy the outcome of participants 
(the treatment group) had they not participated.  
An important feature of the Swedish institutional set-up is the fact that ALMPs 
take place continuously over time. In general, the choice open to unemployed job-




but whether to participate now or to postpone the participation decision and maybe join 
the programme later on. It might therefore be argued that non-participants never truly 
represent a hypothetical benchmark state in which the programme is excluded.8 Within 
this institutional context the benchmark state thus needs to be slightly redefined; what 
we evaluate is the effect of joining the programme compared to further postponing the 
participation decision by not joining the programme at least up to the point of 
evaluation. 
Relying on non-experimental data, and using the outcome of non-participants to 
proxy the non-participation outcome of participants, the question of selection bias 
arises. Selection bias due to observed differences between participants and members of 
the control group can be accounted for using non-parametric matching estimators9 or 
single equation regression methods.  The presence of selection on unobservables is 
usually dealt with using either multi-stage regression methods or simultaneous equations 
estimation. Selection on unobservables may, for example, occur if factors unobserved in 
our data (motivation, ability etc.) influence not only the individual’s decision to 
participate, but also the person’s labour market outcome. External selection is another 
possibility: if local unemployment offices and/or organisers have incentives to choose 
the best among potential participants, then incomplete observation of these assignment 
criteria may induce a positive selection bias.10 Or, the local unemployment office may 
favour those with the poorest chances of getting a job, which would push towards a 
negative selection bias.  
Whether or not we have selection on unobservables is an empirical question. The 
estimation method used in this paper, i.e., maximum likelihood estimation of a multiple 
equation model, allows us to test and correct for potential unobserved selectivity bias.  
 
 
                                                 
8 See Carling & Larsson (2000) for a discussion.  
9 See e.g. Heckman et al (1999). Briefly, matching involves pairing together participants and non-participants who 
have similar observable characteristics. The main advantage using this method is that estimates of average 
treatment effects can be obtained without a parametric specification. However, the method relies on the assumption 
that selection into the programme is based entirely on observable characteristics (an assumption that cannot be 
tested). 
10 This type of behaviour is commonly referred to as “creaming” (see e.g. Anderson et al. (1993)); that is, serving 




3.2 The econometric model 
Let 
∗
i y  be a latent indicator of labour market success in terms of an individual’s 
employment probability: 
∗
i y = γ’zi + diαi + ui     (1)  
 
where  i indexes individuals. 
∗
i y  is assumed to depend on a vector of independent 
variables zi, such as human capital indicators and local labour market conditions, and an 
error term ui. The employment probability also depends on the impact of the 
programme, represented by αi. The dummy indicator di equals 1 if a person participated 
in trainee replacement schemes, and 0 otherwise.   
  The observable dependent variable in this study is whether or not the individual is 
employed by the end of the response period. This variable, denoted by yi, is assumed to 
be generated as 
yi = 1 if 
∗
i y >   0          
yi = 0 if 
∗
i y ≤ 0      (2) 
 
The observable dummy indicator di in (1) is assumed to be generated by the following 
selection equation: 
∗
i d=   β’xi +εi        
di = 1 if 
∗
i d >   0          
di = 0 if 
∗




i d  is a latent variable, xi a vector of variables explaining entry to the programme 
and εi a random error term measuring the impact of unobserved factors on the selection 
process.11  
  In this study we allow for heterogeneity in the estimated programme effects. αi in 
(1) is specified as 
αi = δ’qi       (4) 
 
                                                 




where qi is a vector of explanatory variables with corresponding vector of parameters δ. 
This design has several advantages compared to the standard approach, where 
programme effects usually are represented by a single constant term. Besides giving us a 
richer and more flexible empirical model, we may also study which background 
characteristics are linked with the best programme effect. 
  For the empirical application we use full information maximum likelihood to 
estimate jointly eq. (1) (the employment equation) and eq. (3) (the selection equation). 
This procedure allows us to control for potential selection bias and provides an estimate 
of the correlation ρ between the error terms in the two equations, where it is assumed 
that the error terms follow a bivariate standard normal distribution, (εi, ui)~BN(0;1; ρ). 
Estimation of a positive ρ suggests that those most likely to be selected are also the most 
likely to obtain jobs. A negative ρ would indicate that those most likely to be selected 
are the least likely to obtain jobs.  
 Dropping  the  i subscripts, and assuming we have a random sample of participants 
and non-participants12, the log-likelihood function to be maximised is 
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where φ2(.) denotes the p.d.f. of the bivariate standard normal distribution. Note that for 
the special case where ρ equals zero, the log-likelihood function segments into separate 
parts such that the parameters of the selection and employment equations may be 
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12 As described in Section 4 below, the sampling technique used in this paper oversamples participants in 
replacement schemes relative to their proportion in the population of unemployed. As described in Heckman & 
Robb (1985), choice-based sampling can be accounted for by weighting the sample at hand back to random 
sample proportions. We accomplish this by attaching to each observation in eq. (5) the weight w=d(p/p
*)+(1-
d)[(1-p)/(1-p
*)]. Here p=N1/(N1+N0) and p
*=n1/(n1+n0), where N1 and N0 are the number of participants and non-











































































   
 




A vast majority (about 90 percent) of unemployed Swedish workers are registered at a 
local employment office. These offices register events such as changes from one job 
seeker category to another and participation in ALMPs. The resulting database 
(HÄNDEL), which is administered by the National Labour Market Board, contains 
individual background variables such as education and work experience, as well as 
individual labour market histories. Consequently, we know what ALMPs the 
unemployed have participated in during the unemployment spell, and we also know the 
reason for the end of the spell. 
 
 
4.1 Sample construction 
The data used in this study is a choice-based13 sample from the HÄNDEL database. For 
participants in trainee replacement schemes, we collect from the database all individuals 
who completed a programme spell during the period September-December 1994. To 
reduce unobserved individual heterogeneity we then require that the observation 
satisfies the following selection criteria: 1) the individual was registered as being openly 
unemployed14 prior to the start of the programme, 2) the programme spell lasted at least 
two weeks and no more than 12 months, and, 3) the individual was 20-59 years of age, 
both when the programme started and 18 months after it finished. This leaves us with a 
sample of approximately 6,000 observations. Deleting individuals with missing (or 
                                                 
13 Choice-based, instead of random, sampling was chosen because random sampling of, say, 5000 observations from 
the population of unemployed would have severely reduced the number of participants in replacement schemes. 
14 Specifically, I require that the individual was unemployed and ready to take on a new job immediately (job seeker 




clearly inconsistent) values for any of the variables used in the empirical analysis, the 
resulting sample consists of 3499 observations. 
  Non-participants are selected from the stock of unemployed at the end of October 
1994. From a random sample of 10,000 observations we pick individuals who satisfy 
the following selection criteria: 1) the individual was registered as being openly 
unemployed, 2) the individual was 20-59 years of age at the time of selection and 18 
months forward in time, and 3) the individual did not participate in replacement 
schemes before or after the time of selection. Deleting individuals with missing (or 
clearly inconsistent) values for any of the variables used in the empirical analysis, the 
resulting sample of non-participants consists of 4804 observations.15 The joint sample 
of participants and non-participants will be referred to as sample 1.  
As will become evident in subsection 4.2 below, gender appears to have been an 
important determinant for the probability of entering trainee replacement schemes; in 
sample 1 more than 70 percent of the participants are women (Table A2 in Appendix 
A).16 The fact that only 44 percent of all non-participants in sample 1 are women points 
at large systematic differences between participants and non-participants. Therefore, in 
order to further reduce individual heterogeneity that might be difficult to capture 
accurately in our econometric model, we have constructed an alternative sample made 
up of women only. Deleting all males from sample 1, the alternative sample consists of 
2515 participants and 2114 non-participants. We will refer to this sample as sample 2. 
One obvious consequence of the selection procedures described above will be the 
occurrence of substantial heterogeneity in labour market histories across individuals. 
Some persons may have been engaged in several different programmes in the past, 
whereas others are unemployed for the first time. In our empirical model we will 
attempt to control for the influence of ALMPs that individuals may have completed at 
some point in the past, but the measures are rather crude and we do not discriminate 
between different types of ALMPs. Therefore, to eliminate potential “spillover effects”  
                                                 
15 The date October 31 can be thought of as a hypothetical end (and start) date for a programme spell that never 
happened. Thus, the response period for non-participants starts on October 31, 1994.  
16 The overrepresentation of women became even more pronounced a few years later: AMS (1999) reports a share of 




from earlier programme activities, we should also consider restricting our samples to 
individuals with no previous ALMP experience. Applying this selection criterion to 
sample 1 and sample 2, we end up with two new samples, sample 3 and sample 4. Table 
2 summarises the composition of our four samples, total sample sizes and the 
differences in selection criteria. 
  











































The dependent variable 
In the empirical analysis we use employment in a non-subsidised job as the success 
criterion. The dependent variable is whether or not the individual was employed at the 
end of the response period. The HÄNDEL database contains information on changes 
from one job seeker category to another, and reasons for deactivation of an unemployed 
(i.e., reasons for ending an unemployment spell). Individuals registered as looking for a 
job are sorted into one of the following search categories: openly unemployed, in an 
ALMP or sheltered job, part-time employed, temporarily employed or employed but 
looking for a new job. Reasons for deactivation include some kind of regular 
employment (including recalls) and withdrawal from the labour force due to retirement, 
education outside the employment office or other known reasons. 
  In this paper we classify an individual as being employed at time t if he/she 1) was 
registered at time t as part-time employed, temporarily employed or employed but 
looking for a new job, or 2) was deactivated before time t due to transition to a regular 
job. Table 3 summarises the outcome measures for participants and non-participants in 





Table 3. Employment rates following programme end
a 
  sample 1  sample 2  sample 3    sample 4 
  part.    non-part. part. non-part. part. non-part.    part. non-part.
employed after  

















6  months  (%)  42.5    27.1 43.7 27.0 46.5 31.5    47.8 30.4 
12  months  (%)  43.1    34.9 42.0 31.8 46.8 40.0    45.8 36.4 
18  months  (%)  49.9    38.2 49.7 37.4 53.2 43.7    52.8 41.7 
a The employment rate for non-participants refers to the rate that is measured, say, 3 months after the time of selection (i.e., 




The employment probability in eq. (1) can be expected to depend on the relationship 
between the wage available to the unemployed in the local labour market and the 
person’s reservation wage, as well as characteristics of the programme and other local 
labour market conditions. In estimation we use as control variables typical human 
capital indicators such as sex, age, citizenship, experience and level of education. 
Additional variables include unemployment insurance, the type of job applied for, 
previous (pre-programme) unemployment experience and the individual’s past 
experience of ALMPs. As indicators of local labour market conditions we use e.g. 
location, the local unemployment rate, the exit rate to regular employment and the 
programme rate (ALMP participants÷unemployed) in the municipality. To allow for 
individual programme effects, the full set of control variables is also included in eq. (4).  
  Participation in programmes is based on both self-selection and external selection 
by the local employment office and the organiser/employer. Since the employment 
probability presumably is an important decision variable, it appears that all variables in 
the employment equation should enter the selection equation. We should also consider 
variables that can be expected to influence a person’s probability of entering the 
programme but not the employment outcome after participation. A natural candidate 




therefore constructed such a “rationing” variable by measuring the weight of 
replacement schemes in the municipality’s supply of ALMPs.17 
Table A1 in Appendix A contains a complete list and explanation of the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. According to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 
A2, replacement schemes seem to be targeted mainly at women who apply for health, 
nursing or social work.  Those under 25 years of age are more frequent among 
participants than non-participants, whereas the opposite holds for those over 50. 
Individuals of foreign origin appear to be underrepresented among participants, as are 
individuals with low formal education and no specific education for the type of job 
applied for. A typical replacement scheme takes place after about 15 weeks of open 
unemployment. Total number of weeks as openly unemployed since September 1991 
averages 47 for participants and 53 for non-participants. Finally, the typical participant 
has completed 1.3 programmes and spent 25 weeks in various ALMPs prior to the 
replacement scheme, whereas non-participants have spent about 20 weeks in 




Results on the estimated determinants of enrolment are presented in Section 5.1. In 
Section 5.2 we study individuals’ employment probabilities in the absence of trainee 
replacement schemes. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 contain the estimated programme effects.  
 
5.1 The selection equation 
5.1.1 Observed selection 
A straightforward way to examine the presence of non-random selection into the 
programme is to study whether observable personal characteristics and labour market 
conditions have an impact on the individual’s probability of entering the programme. 
Parameter estimates, standard errors and marginal effects generated by the bivariate 
                                                 
17 Identification of the bivariate probit model requires that at least one variable is not included in both equations 
(employment and selection). The correlation between the “rationing” variable and the local unemployment rate 
(programme rate) is only about -0.20 (+0.20). In addition, several variables are time varying, like the labour 




probit model, with the response period set to 6 months18, are displayed in Table 4 
(sample 1 and sample 2) and Table B1 in Appendix B (sample 3 and sample 4).  
  The probability of females entering replacement schemes is about 4 percentage 
points higher than for males. This is perhaps what one would expect given that the vast 
majority of replacement schemes took place in the public sector, and that the public 
sector mainly attracts women. For sample 1, being over 50 years of age reduces the 
probability of entering the programme by 2.4 percentage points. However, this effect is 
insignificant when the sample is restricted to females or individuals with no previous 
ALMP experience. For the latter samples, the results suggest that those under 25 have 
the highest probability of entering the programme. Variables such as education level, 
experience and citizenship turn out statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The 
type of job applied for appears to be an important determinant of enrolment into 
replacement schemes. Those who applied for a job other than health, nursing or social 
work have a 6-8 percentage points lower probability of entering the programme (8-11 
percentage points when the sample is restricted to females).  A more widespread 
accustomedness to temporary jobs and the use of substitutes would seem like a plausible 
explanation to why replacement schemes mainly took place within the public sector, e.g. 
in healthcare and social work. 
Previous experience of open unemployment (since September 1991) seems to 
matter negatively for participation. This might perhaps reflect a tendency among 
employment officers to give precedence to unemployed with strong labour market 
attachments, while directing persons with long unemployment periods to some other, 
more low-qualified, policy programme. However, the effect is not large: for each 
additional week as openly unemployed, the probability of participating in replacement 
schemes is reduced by about 0.1 percentage points. Previous experience of ALMPs 
appears to be positive for placement in the programme. One explanation could be that 
unemployed with past experience of programmes may themselves be more active in 
getting into more programmes. Finally, it should be noted that the supply of replacement 
schemes has a significantly positive effect; that is, an increased share of replacement  
                                                 
18 The main results in subsection are quite insensitive to the choice of response period (3 months, 6 months etc.). 




Table 4. The selection equation. Response period: 6 months. 
  sample 1    sample 2 
  variable    estimate    std.error marg. eff.    estimate  std.error    marg. eff. 
 constant  -1.882***   0.243  27.47    -1.592*** 0.435  31.71 
 female  0.288***   0.065  4.24           
  age24  0.080  0.077  1.32    0.062  0.092   1.30 
  age29  0.079  0.077  1.31    0.065  0.089   1.39 
  age49  0.002  0.082  0.04    0.031  0.092   0.66 
 age59  -0.161*    0.096  -2.35    -0.124  0.120    -2.42 
 cit1  -0.172    0.188  -2.46    -0.234  0.207    -4.26 
 cit2  -0.181    0.127  -2.58    -0.201  0.149    -3.76 
  dis  0.015  0.113  0.25    -0.079  0.135  -1.59 
  ed1  0.077  0.073  1.21    0.141  0.091   2.84 
 ed2  -0.038    0.112  -0.60    0.001  0.119    0.01 
 exp1  -0.002    0.075  -0.04    -0.055  0.089    -1.14 
 exp2  -0.031    0.076  -0.49    -0.044  0.093    -0.92 
  edspec  0.093  0.062  1.46    0.116  0.073   2.35 
 job1  -0.660***   0.151  -6.85    -0.767*** 0.174  -10.11 
 job2  -0.745***   0.087  -7.90    -0.797*** 0.090  -11.36 
 job3  -0.820***    0.109 -7.93    -0.850*** 0.116    -11.10 
 job4  -0.790***    0.186  -7.38  -1.064*** 0.318    -11.42 
 job5  -0.774***    0.139  -7.38  -0.732*** 0.233    -9.76 
 job6  -0.741***    0.088  -8.19  -0.748*** 0.143    -10.12 
 job7  -0.456***    0.089  -5.76  -0.471*** 0.096    -7.90 
 ui  0.113    0.105  1.72  0.101  0.117    2.01 
 ca  -0.055    0.158  -0.85  -0.009  0.168    -0.19 
 move   -0.102    0.077  -1.56  -0.116  0.095    -2.29 
 scat12  0.197***    0.075  3.44  0.134  0.093    2.93 
 ue  0.001    0.003  0.02  -0.003  0.004    -0.06 
 ueˆ2  0.000    0.000  0.00  0.000*  0.000    0.00 
 uet  -0.004***    0.001  -0.07  -0.005*** 0.001    -0.10 
 nue  0.069**    0.029  1.16  0.088**  0.034    1.92 
 prog  -0.003    0.002  -0.05  -0.004  0.003    -0.08 
 nprog  0.104***    0.040  1.79  0.112**  0.045    2.49 
 progx  0.222***    0.080  3.52  0.292***  0.085    6.02 
 reg1  -0.120    0.101  -1.81  -0.157  0.123    -3.04 
 reg2  0.009    0.071  0.14  0.057  0.082    1.19 
 reg3  0.038    0.076  0.62    0.041  0.086    0.86 
 ler  -0.009    0.019  -0.15  -0.009  0.025    -0.18 
 lur  -0.012    0.020  -0.19  0.001  0.026    0.01 
 lpr  0.002    0.003  0.04  -0.001  0.004    -0.02 
 lrs  0.051***    0.008  0.85  0.060***  0.008    1.30 
 log-likelihood  -5978.90      -3621.63 
 goodness of fit    0.087      0.094 
 chi-squared     1138.06      748.34 
 no. of observations   8303      4629 
Note: Bivariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. The log-
likelihood refers to the value obtained for the full model, including the parameters of the employment equation and 
the equation for programme effects. The goodness of fit measure is 1-(lnL/lnL0), where lnL0 is the log-likelihood 






schemes in the municipality’s mix of ALMPs increases the probability of participation. 
We find no significant effects of other supply side variables such as the local 
unemployment and programme rates.  
 
 
5.1.2 Unobserved selection 
The joint estimation of eq. (1) (the employment equation) and eq. (3) (the selection 
equation) allows us to control for potential selection bias, and provides an estimate of 
the correlation ρ between the error terms in the two equations. Estimation of a positive ρ 
suggests that those most likely to be selected are also the most likely to obtain jobs. A 
negative ρ would indicate that those most likely to be selected are the least likely to 
obtain jobs. Estimation of only the employment equation in (1) would result in biased 
estimates unless ρ is equal to zero. 
The results are displayed in Table 5. Note that we have also estimated the more 
conventional specification in which programme effects are constrained to be constant 
across individuals, i.e.,αi = δ0. The estimated covariance between the error terms is in 
most cases both small and insignificant. Likelihood ratio test of the restriction ρ=0 
cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels, expect for a few cases when the 
response period is set to 12 months. However, the null hypothesis (ρ=0) cannot be 
rejected for this response period when the sample is restricted to individuals with no 
previous ALMP experience.  
Hence, if factors unobserved in our data (motivation, ability etc.) influence 
participation decisions, then these factors do not appear to have any significant effects 
on the likelihood of successful job placement, and vice versa.19 In the following we 
therefore regard the correlation between the error terms in the equations for selection 
and employment as being equal to zero by imposing the restriction ρ=0 in estimation. 
As described in Section 3.2, the log-likelihood function then segments into separate 
parts such that the parameters of the employment equation may be estimated separately 
using the univariate probit model. 
 
                                                 




Table 5. The correlation coefficient. 
  sample 1    sample 2 
   response period    αi = δ’qi  αi = δ0    αi = δ’qi    αi = δ0   
   3 months    -0.045 (0.02)  0.158 (0.98)    0.003 (0.002)   0.159 (1.40)   
   6 months    0.088 (0.14)  0.170 (1.24)    0.215 (0.80)    -0.244 (2.68)   
   12 months    0.398** (4.20)    0.313** (4.96)   0.407* (2.84)   0.315* (3.04)   
   18 months    0.149 (0.48)  0.161 (1.26)    0.048 (0.04)    0.079 (0.22)   
                
  sample 3    sample 4 
   αi = δ’qi  αi = δ0    αi = δ’qi    αi = δ0   
   3 months    0.059 (0.04)    0.134 (0.28)    0.172 (0.20)    0.100 (0.12)   
   6 months    -0.135 (0.08)    0.072 (0.08)    0.268 (0.42)    0.170 (0.38)   
   12 months    -0.143 (0.06)    0.142 (0.26)    0.394 (0.92)    0.243 (0.60)   
   18 months    -0.395 (0.90)    -0.034 (0.02)    -0.073 (0.02)    -0.048 (0.02)   
 
Note: Bivariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Chi-
square test statistics in parentheses. We perform a likelihood ratio test of the restriction ρ=0. The test statistic is 
-2(lnLR -lnLU), where LR is the likelihood corresponding to the model with one linear restriction (ρ=0) and LU 




5.2 The employment equation 
In this section we study whether observable personal characteristics and labour market 
conditions have an impact on the individual’s employment probability. Programme 
effects are discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4 below. The results for a response period of 
6 months are displayed in Table 6 (sample 1 and sample 2) and Table B2 in Appendix B 
(sample 3 and sample 4).20 
Many coefficients are significant and have signs according to economic theory. 
The probability of females having a job at the end of the response period is about 3 
percentage points lower than for males.21 However, this effect is insignificant when the 
sample is restricted to individuals with no previous ALMP experience (sample 3). Being 
over 50 years of age decreases significantly the probability of finding a job. The results 
also suggest that those under 25 have difficulties finding a job. 
                                                 
20 The results for other response periods are available upon request. Coefficient estimates and significance levels 
vary slightly with the length of the response period, but the main results reported in this subsection remain 
virtually unchanged. 
21 Using data from the mid-1990s, Carling et al (1999) found a similar pattern in a study of how job-finding rates 
were affected by a reduction in replacement rates. In other studies using data from the early 1990s, e.g. Carling et 




Table 6. The employment equation. Response period: 6 months. 
  sample 1    sample 2 
  variable    estimate    std.error marg. eff.    estimate  std.error    marg. eff. 
  constant  0.175    0.623  38.29  0.144  0.188    38.26 
 female  -0.087**   0.039  -3.09           
 age24  -0.146**   0.059  -5.01    -0.048  0.069    -1.73 
  age29  0.060  0.048  2.14    0.053  0.060   1.92 
 age49  -0.008    0.048  -0.28    0.033  0.063    1.20 
 age59  -0.304***   0.056  -9.92    -0.251*** 0.076  -8.55 
  cit1  0.000  0.108  0.00    0.043  0.124   1.57 
 cit2  -0.530***   0.080  -15.91    -0.559*** 0.103  -17.18 
 dis  -0.552***   0.081  -16.58    -0.460*** 0.108  -14.66 
 ed1  0.106**   0.046  3.67    0.115* 0.059    4.08 
 ed2  0.210***   0.068  7.62    0.304*** 0.079    11.37 
 exp1  0.025    0.051  0.89    0.103* 0.062    3.72 
  exp2  0.002  0.053  0.07    0.080  0.065   2.87 
 edspec  0.091**   0.037  3.16    0.056  0.049    2.01 
 job1  -0.314***   0.080  -10.10    -0.413*** 0.097  -13.24 
 job2  -0.205***   0.059  -6.88    -0.173*** 0.059  -6.01 
 job3  -0.247***    0.068  -8.16  -0.394*** 0.072  -12.83 
 job4  0.007    0.099  0.24  -0.141  0.160    -4.91 
 job5  0.006    0.081  0.19  -0.016  0.131    -0.58 
 job6  -0.178***    0.062  -6.03  -0.385*** 0.092    -12.50 
 job7  -0.157**    0.066  -5.35  -0.208*** 0.072    -7.16 
 ui  -0.049    0.060  -1.74  -0.093  0.069    -3.38 
 ca  0.112    0.079  4.04  0.110  0.100    4.05 
 move   -0.026    0.042  -0.89  0.054  0.063    1.97 
 scat12  0.030    0.051  1.05  0.145**  0.070    5.31 
 ue  -0.007***    0.002  -0.24  -0.009*** 0.003    -0.32 
 ueˆ2  0.000***    0.000  0.00  0.000***  0.000    0.00 
 uet  -0.007***    0.001  -0.24  -0.007*** 0.001    -0.23 
 nue  0.153***    0.018  5.56  0.130***  0.026    4.78 
 prog  0.001    0.001  0.02  0.001  0.002    0.05 
 nprog  -0.006    0.027  -0.22  -0.018  0.038    -0.63 
 progx  -0.004    0.047  -0.14  0.045  0.064    1.61 
 reg1  -0.045    0.096  -1.55  0.037  0.070    1.33 
 reg2  -0.005    0.047  -0.17  0.069  0.058    2.48 
 reg3  -0.088    0.064  -3.05    -0.024  0.064    -0.86 
 ler  -0.002    0.029  -0.05  -0.003  0.016    -0.12 
 lur  -0.039***    0.010  -1.36  -0.037**  0.014    -1.31 
 lpr  0.001    0.003  0.04  -0.003  0.003    -0.10 
 log-likelihood  -4659.70      -2590.04 
 goodness of fit    0.072      0.078 
 chi-squared     723.56      438.62 
 no. of observations   8303      4629 
Note: Univariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. The log-
likelihood refers to the value obtained for the full model, including the parameters of the equation for programme 
effects. The goodness of fit measure is 1-(lnL/lnL0), where lnL0 is the log-likelihood corresponding to a 







Non-Nordic immigrants and the disabled are the two groups with the smallest 
chances of being employed at the end of the observation period. For example, among 
women with no previous experience of ALMPs (sample 4), non-Nordic immigrants 
have an employment probability that is almost 30 percentage points lower than for 
Swedish citizens. Better education is uniformly associated with higher job finding rates. 
Similarly, improved experience has the expected positive effects (although insignificant 
in a few of our samples). The type of job applied for appears to be an important 
determinant of the employment probability. Those who applied for health, nursing or 
social work (i.e. the type of jobs that frequently stood as organisers for replacement 
schemes) seem to have considerably better chances of finding a job than individuals in 
almost any other line of work.22  
Previous episodes of open unemployment seem to have a negative influence on 
the probability of finding a job. A common interpretation of this negative relationship 
refers to the stigmatising effects of being openly unemployed. Survey evidence in e.g. 
Behrenz (1998) and Agell & Lundborg (1999) confirm that employers often regard 
individuals with extensive unemployment records as less productive. Another possibility 
is that search activity may decrease with the duration of open unemployment. However, 
there is little empirical evidence for the existence of such discouragement effects (see 
e.g. Ackum Agell (1996) or Harkman & Jansson (1995)). Previous participation in 
various ALMPs does not appear to make a significant difference. This is consistent with 
the view that policy programmes in general have little, or even a negative, influence on 
the exit rate to regular employment (see e.g. the citations in the introduction). Similarly, 
we find no significant effects of supply side variables such as the dummies for location 
and the programme rate, but the local unemployment rate is significant and has the 
expected negative sign. 
Let us conclude this subsection by turning to the question whether replacement 
schemes were given to individuals with a high ex ante probability of employment. 
                                                 
22 Recall that the success measure used in this paper includes part-time and temporary employment. It is unclear 
whether the higher employment probabilities for health, nursing and social work (where part-time and temporary 
work is fairly common) would remain if the employment measure were restricted to full-time employment in 




Evaluating the estimated employment function at mean sample values23, Table 7 reports 
the probability of having a job by the end of the response period in the absence of 
replacement schemes. The results suggest that participants indeed have a higher 
expected employment rate whether they participate or not. The difference compared to 
non-participants is about 3 to 5 percentage points, depending on the composition of the 
sample and the choice of response period.  
 
Table 7. Predicted employment rates in the absence of replacement schemes. 
   sample 1  sample 2  sample 3    sample 4 
   part.   non-part. part. non-part. part. non-part.    part.    non-part.
employed after  

















6 months (%)    30.7    25.3  32.4  25.1  34.5  30.2    34.6    28.5 
12 months (%)    36.1    33.4  35.3  30.4  39.9  38.8    39.4    34.8 
18 months (%)    40.0    36.8  41.2  36.0  43.7  42.8    44.2    40.6 
 
One can think of several explanations to why this may have occurred. First, as 
noted in Section 2 above, since the substitute was expected to replace a regularly 
employed worker, a potential participant was presumably supposed to have a certain 
level of education, labour market experience etc., and other special characteristics 
required by the employer. Thus, the selection process would to some degree reflect 
employers’ normal recruitment behaviour24, with little room for employment officers to 
give priority to the unemployed with the poorest chances of getting a job.  
Another explanation may possibly be found in the behaviour of employment 
officers. Recall that participants were selected from among qualified candidates by the 
local employment office. If programme administrators were interested in maximising re-
employment rates, or for some other reason gave priority to the better off workers, then 
we expect to find a strong positive correlation between factors affecting selection into 
the programme and job placement. As we have seen, this is certainly true for a number  
                                                 
23 Using equations (1) and (2), the expected employment probability is calculated separately for participants and 
non-participants as pr(y=1|d=0)=Φ( z ' γ ), where Φ(.) is the c.d.f. of the univariate standard normal distribution. 
24 Using survey data on the recruitment behaviour of Swedish employers, Behrenz (1998) finds that lack of 
education/experience and being over 45 years of age are important selection variables when the employer decides 
not to call a job applicant to an interview. Also, many employers seem to view open unemployment as a negative 
signal. Among those who are called to an interview, characteristics such as personal engagement and social 




of variables. However, this explanation is not entirely convincing. For example, the 
disabled, non-Nordic immigrants and people with less experience were not significantly 
underrepresented among the participants in replacement schemes. For females and 
young people in their early 20s, we even find some support for a negative relationship 
between job placement and selection.  
 
 
5.3 Programme effects 
We now turn to the employment effects of replacement schemes. We interpret the 
estimated effect as the change in individuals’ employment probabilities following 
participation in the programme. Evaluated at sample means (the sub-sample of 
participants), an estimate of the average programme effect is given by pr(y=1| d=1, z ,q ) 
- pr(y=1| d=0, z ), or, 
 
 programme  effect  = Φ( q ' z ' δ γ + ) - Φ( z ' γ )       (7) 
 
Programme effects will in the following be referred to as short-term or long-term. Short-
term (long-term) refers to the results associated with a response period of 3-6 months 
(12-18 months).  
After allowing for person specific effects, and adjusting for observed selection, the 
results in Table 8 suggest that participation in replacement schemes increased the short-
term employment probability by on average 11 to 13 percentage points. Long-term 
effects appear to be smaller, somewhere in the range 6-9 percentage points. However, it 
should be noted that the decomposed programme effects underlying the figures in Table 
8, i.e. the coefficients in the vector δ in (7), were estimated with poor precision. In fact, 
not a single coefficient in the regressions turned out to be significantly different from 
zero at the 5 percent level or better.25  
To obtain more precise estimates of the individualised programme effects, we first 
narrowed down the set of explanatory variables in the equation for programme effects to 
a vector of personal characteristics such as sex, age, citizenship, education and 
                                                 
25 For this reason, and to conserve on space, estimates of the decomposed programme effects are not reported in the 




experience. This procedure did not change the overall results much; the constant term 
and the age dummy for individuals in their 50s came out significant in a few of the 
regressions. However, likelihood ratio tests of the joint hypothesis δ0=δ1=…=δk=0 were 
usually rejected at conventional significance levels.  
 
Table 8: Average programme effects (percentage points); α α α αi = δ δ δ δ’qi. 
response period    sample  1    sample 2  sample 3  sample 4 
3 months    12.60    11.61  12.68  13.05 
6 months    11.02    10.91  11.41  13.00 
12 months    6.35    6.05  5.89  5.44 
18 months    9.62    8.38  9.43  8.46 
 
 
The model was therefore re-estimated under the assumption of identical 
programme effects across individuals (i.e., the parameter vector δ in (7) was restricted to 
consist of a constant term δ0). Coefficient estimates, the estimated programme effects 
and confidence intervals are displayed in Table 9. The coefficients are in most cases 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level or better. The estimated 
programme effects are very much in line with the results reported in Table 8 above; that 
is, participation in replacement schemes appears to have increased the short-term 
employment probability by 11 to 13 percentage points, whereas long-term effects seem 
to be slightly (insignificantly) smaller, about 6-9 percentage points.26  
To sum up, the results presented in this subsection appear to be somewhat at odds 
with the view that policy programmes in general have little, if any, influence on the exit 
rate to regular employment. One likely explanation is that trainee replacement schemes, 
to a larger extent than many other ALMPs (where participants mainly performed low-
qualified tasks), may have provided individuals with useful work experience and an 
opportunity to make valuable contacts. One such contact was, of course, the 
employer/organiser of the replacement scheme. If the substitute’s stay with the employer  
                                                 
26 Using a similar specification and a response period of about 12 months, AMS (1999) reports a considerably larger 
programme effect (a coefficient estimate of 0.566) for participants in replacement schemes. The precise reason for 
this discrepancy is unclear, but may well reflect differences in sample periods (their study covers individuals who 
finished the programme during the last quarter of 1996), selection criteria and the construction of variables. 
Another difference is that AMS (1999) used survey data to measure the dependent variable. Moreover, our 




proved successful, then he/she supposedly had a good chance of getting a regular job 
once the employer needed to fill a vacancy. This is also confirmed by the survey 
evidence in AMS (1999): 12 months after leaving the programme in late 1996, more 
than 60 percent of those who held a regular job had found employment with the 
organiser of the replacement scheme.27 The corresponding figure for work experience 
schemes was less than 20 percent, and for relief work about 30 percent. 
 
Table 9: Programme effects: α α α αi = δ δ δ δ0. 
response period   sample 1  sample 2  sample 3    sample 4 
coefficient:         
3 months  0.397*** (29.92)  0.357*** (20.64)  0.383*** (11.62)    0.380*** (9.84) 
6 months  0.301*** (18.16)  0.294*** (14.72)  0.303*** (7.52)    0.334*** (7.86) 
12 months  0.170** (5.72)  0.163** (4.48)  0.158 (1.98)    0.146 (1.46) 
18 months  0.244*** (12.00)  0.212*** (7.86)  0.236** (4.42)    0.210* (3.02) 
programme effect 
(percentage points): 
       
3  months  12.86*** 11.77*** 13.31***    13.38*** 
6  months  11.23*** 11.10*** 11.68***    12.94*** 
12 months  6.50**  6.20**  6.20     5.70  
18 months  9.64***  8.38***  9.38**    8.34* 
confidence interval  
(5 percent level): 
       
3 months  7.9 , 18.1  6.4 , 17.5  5.4 , 21.8    4.8 , 22.6 
6 months  5.9 , 16.7  5.4 , 17.0  3.2 , 20.3    3.8 , 22.2 
12 months  1.2 , 12.0  0.5 , 12.1  -2.4 , 15.0     -3.5 , 15.2  
18 months  3.9 , 15.4  2.4 , 14.4  0.6 , 18.0    -1.1 , 17.6 
Note: Univariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Chi-square test 
statistics in parentheses. We perform a likelihood ratio test of the restriction δ0=0. The test statistic is -2(lnLR -lnLU), where 
LR is the likelihood corresponding to the model with one linear restriction (δ0=0) and LU the likelihood for the unrestricted 




5.4 Redefining the response period 
As discussed in Section 3.1 above, we have so far interpreted the programme effects in 
terms of human capital accumulation. Another aspect of participation is the cost of 
having less time for job-searching activities. In this section we expand the concept of 
programme effects by taking “lock-in” effects into account. The response period is now 
                                                 
27 A large fraction of the hirings presumably took place instantly at the end of the programme period. According to 
the register data used in this paper, slightly more than 20 percent of the programme spells ended in some kind of 
employment. We have, however, no way of telling whether these individuals were employed by the organiser or 




redefined as the time span between the programme start and the moment the outcome is 
measured. Consequently, the estimated programme effects may now be interpreted as 
the joint effect of human capital accumulation and reduced (zero) search activity.28  
In sum, the results generated by the bivariate probit model offered no strong 
evidence for the existence of unobserved selection bias (see Table B3 in Appendix B). 
Disregarding selection on unobservables by imposing the restriction ρ=0, the individual 
specific programme effects were again estimated with poor precision. The model was 
therefore re-estimated under the assumption of identical programme effects across 
individuals. Coefficient estimates, the estimated programme effects and confidence 
intervals are displayed in Table 10.  
 
Table 10: Programme effects: α α α αi = δ δ δ δ0. 
response period   sample 1  sample 2  sample 3    sample 4 
coefficient:         
3 months  -0.230*** (7.78)  -0.260*** (8.50)  -0.241* (3.70)    -0.184 (1.86) 
6 months  -0.034 (0.22)  -0.034 (0.18)  -0.059 (0.28)    -0.037 (0.10) 
12 months  0.149** (4.42)  0.180** (5.56)  0.133 (1.40)    0.173 (2.06) 
18 months  0.105 (2.20)  0.045 (0.34)  0.141 (1.56)    0.120 (1.00) 
programme effect 
(percentage points): 
       
3 months  -5.83***   -6.72***   -6.74*     -5.19  
6 months  -1.18   -1.21   -2.14     -1.33  
12 months  5.70**   6.89**   5.22     6.77  
18 months  4.11   1.76   5.60     4.77  
confidence interval  
(5 percent level): 
       
3 months  -9.2 , -1.8  -10.4 , -2.3  -12.3 , 0.3    -11.4 , 2.8 
6 months  -5.9 , 4.0  -6.4 , 4.4  -9.7 , 6.2    -9.5 , 7.8 
12 months  0.3 , 11.2  1.2 , 12.8  -3.3 , 14.0    -2.4 , 16.1 
18 months  -1.3 , 9.7  -4.0 , 7.7  -3.1 , 14.4    -4.5 , 14.1 
Note: Univariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Chi-square test 
statistics in parentheses. We perform a likelihood ratio test of the restriction δ0=0. The test statistic is -2(lnLR -lnLU), 
where LR is the likelihood corresponding to the model with one linear restriction (δ0=0) and LU the likelihood for the 
unrestricted model. Confidence intervals are calculated using (7) and the estimated standard error for δ0. 
 
 
First, it should be noted that (with a slight variation across samples) almost 50 
percent of the programme spells lasted 3 months or longer, 25 percent lasted 4 months 
or longer, and that only a small fraction had a duration of 6 months or longer. This 
                                                 
28 Alternatively, suppose that participants’ search activities were unaffected during the programme period. The 
approach used in this subsection would then be appropriate for capturing the human capital effect. However, as 




should account for the negative programme effect associated with a response period of 3 
months; that is, in the very short-run the “lock-in” effect outweighs the human capital 
effect of participating. Six months after entering the programme the estimated effect 
appears to be insignificantly different from zero, which suggests that human capital 
effects now make up for the cancelling of job-search activities during participation. 
Extending the response period beyond 6 months, it appears that the human capital effect 
outweighs the lock-in effect. Evaluating the employment effects 12 months after 
entering the programme, thus taking both human capital effects and the time spent in the 
programme into account, participation in replacement schemes seems to have increased 




The objective of this paper has been to estimate the employment effects of the 
temporary jobs that were created as part of the trainee replacement schemes. Trainee 
replacement schemes, which were in operation from 1991 to 1997, seem to have been 
targeted mainly at women who applied for public sector work such as health, nursing or 
social work. Previous experience of open unemployment appears to have mattered 
negatively for participation. This might perhaps reflect a tendency among employment 
officers to give precedence to unemployed with strong labour market attachments, while 
directing persons with long unemployment periods to some other, more low-qualified, 
policy programme.  
Studying whether observable personal characteristics and labour market 
conditions have an impact on the individual’s employment probability, many 
coefficients turn out statistically significant with signs according to economic theory. 
The results suggest that participants in replacement schemes had a higher ex ante 
probability of employment. A plausible explanation lies in the fact that the substitute 
was expected to replace a regularly employed worker, which presumably meant that a 
potential participant needed a certain level of education and labour market experience.  
We were unable to obtain precise estimates of the individualised programme 




across individuals, the results suggest that participation in trainee replacement schemes 
increased the (long-term) employment probability by 5 to 10 percentage points.29 
Several earlier studies have found little, if any (or even a negative), influence of various 
policy programmes on the exit rate to regular employment. It seems likely that 
replacement schemes, to a larger extent than many other ALMPs (classroom vocational 
training or work experience schemes where participants mainly perform low-qualified 
tasks), may have provided individuals with useful work experience and an opportunity 
to make valuable contacts. Further, spending time at the working site presumably 
improved the chances of getting a regular job once the employer needed to fill a 
vacancy. This is confirmed by survey evidence, which suggest that many substitutes in 




















                                                 
29 The effect concerns the impact of joining the programme compared to not joining the programme at least up to the 
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Table A1. List of variables.  
variable explanation 
female  =1 if female, otherwise 0 
age24  =1 if aged 20 to 24, otherwise 0 
age29  =1 if aged 25 to 29, otherwise 0 
age39   aged 30 to 39 (reference category) 
age49  =1 if aged 40 to 49, otherwise 0 
age59  =1 if aged 50 to 59, otherwise 0 
cit0   Swedish citizen (reference category) 
cit1  =1 if foreign citizen: Nordic, otherwise 0 
cit2  =1 if foreign citizen: non-Nordic, otherwise 0 
dis  =1 if disabled, otherwise 0 
ed0   compulsory level of education (reference category) 
ed1  =1 if high school level of education, otherwise 0 
ed2  =1 if university level of education, otherwise 0 
exp0   no experience from the type of job applied for (reference category) 
exp1  =1 if some experience, otherwise 0 
exp2  =1 if good experience, otherwise 0 
edspec  has specific education for the type of job applied for, otherwise 0 
job0   applying for health and nursing work, social work; the NYK occupational classification, 
NYK1 (reference category) 
job1  =1 if applying for professional, technical or related work (NYK0) 
job2  =1 if applying for administrative, managerial or clerical work (NYK2)  
job3  =1 if applying for commercial work (NYK3) 
job4  =1 if applying for agricultural, forestry or fishing work (NYK4) 
job5  =1 if applying for transport or communications work (NYK6) 
job6  =1 if applying for work in manufacturing or related work  (NYK5, 7, 8) 
job7  =1 if applying for service work (NYK9) 
ui  =1 if receiving unemployment insurance benefits, otherwise 0 
ca  =1 if receiving cash assistance, otherwise 0 
nb   neither unemployment insurance benefits nor cash assistance (reference category) 
move   =1 if willing to accept a job that involves moving/commuting, otherwise 0  
scat12  =1 if ever registered in search category 12 (special assistance needed), otherwise 0 
ue  number of weeks openly unemployed before the programme start (before being selected 
to the control group) 
uet  number of weeks openly unemployed since September 1, 1991 
nue  number of unemployment spells ending with regular employment 
prog  number of weeks in different ALMPs since September 1, 1991 
nprog  number of ALMP spells since September 1, 1991 
progx  =1 if participating in an ALMP during the last 12 months, otherwise 0  
reg0   living in a region other than a big city or forest region (reference category) 
reg1  =1 if living in the Stockholm region, otherwise 0 
reg2  =1 if living in any other big city region, otherwise 0 
reg3  =1 if living in forest region, otherwise 0 
ler
a  exit rate to regular employment (exiting ÷ unemployed) in the municipality 
lur
a  unemployment rate (unemployed ÷ population aged 16-64) in the municipality 
lpr
a  programme rate (ALMP participants ÷ unemployed) in the municipality 
lrs
a  participants in replacement schemes ÷ ALMP participants in the municipality 




Table A2. Sample means
a 
     sample 1
b    sample 2
c sample  3
d sample  4
e 
 variable     part.   non-part.   part.  non-part. part.  non-part. part.   non-part.
  female      0.719  0.440  1.000  1.000  0.729  0.475  1.000  1.000 
  age24      0.275  0.198  0.286  0.203  0.242  0.165  0.238  0.155 
  age29      0.209  0.192  0.206  0.200  0.247  0.205  0.251  0.225 
 age39      0.257    0.266    0.254  0.274  0.238  0.269  0.249    0.304 
  age49      0.181  0.200  0.179  0.183  0.191  0.200  0.184  0.176 
  age59      0.078  0.144  0.075  0.140  0.082  0.161  0.078  0.140 
 cit0      0.943    0.919    0.940  0.906  0.961  0.934  0.965    0.921 
  cit1      0.016  0.022  0.018  0.031  0.017  0.018  0.018  0.026 
  cit2      0.041  0.059  0.042  0.063  0.022  0.048  0.017  0.053 
  dis      0.064  0.062  0.052  0.061  0.043  0.032  0.033  0.027 
 ed0      0.162    0.259    0.144  0.258  0.150  0.270  0.134    0.267 
  ed1      0.693  0.604  0.698  0.578  0.639  0.549  0.640  0.530 
  ed2      0.145  0.137  0.158  0.164  0.211  0.181  0.226  0.203 
 exp0      0.175    0.170    0.174  0.169  0.163  0.149  0.161    0.134 
  exp1      0.392  0.295  0.407  0.340  0.321  0.244  0.324  0.280 
  exp2      0.433  0.535  0.419  0.491  0.516  0.607  0.515  0.586 
  edspec      0.684  0.609  0.704  0.575  0.705  0.606  0.729  0.576 
 job0      0.528    0.163    0.654  0.270  0.563  0.180  0.672    0.312 
  job1      0.031  0.058  0.020  0.058  0.034  0.063  0.022  0.056 
  job2      0.097  0.153  0.106  0.237  0.091  0.171  0.100  0.248 
  job3      0.056  0.124  0.056  0.156  0.056  0.133  0.055  0.152 
  job4      0.015  0.035  0.005  0.018  0.014  0.032  0.005  0.018 
  job5      0.023  0.061  0.011  0.027  0.028  0.069  0.016  0.026 
  job6      0.130  0.292  0.034  0.078  0.106  0.231  0.027  0.054 
  job7      0.120  0.114  0.114  0.156  0.108  0.121  0.103  0.165 
  ui      0.880  0.823  0.874  0.813  0.836  0.765  0.842  0.787 
  ca      0.052  0.080  0.053  0.071  0.057  0.100  0.055  0.074 
 nb      0.068    0.097    0.073  0.116  0.107  0.135  0.103    0.139 
 move      0.134    0.169    0.110  0.126  0.148  0.166  0.115    0.118 
  scat12      0.179  0.137  0.155  0.133  0.087  0.037  0.069  0.039 
  ue      14.57  17.20  12.881  16.276  16.92  17.82  14.47  16.54 
  uet      46.97  53.16  42.670  47.091  33.15  33.66  29.70  30.45 
  nue      0.751  0.589  0.774  0.539  0.653  0.570  0.640  0.483 
  prog      24.86  19.87  24.145  18.030  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  nprog      1.332  1.032  1.289  0.920  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  progx      0.543  0.446  0.533  0.400  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 reg0      0.094    0.177    0.094  0.207  0.130  0.238  0.125    0.253 
  reg1      0.277  0.286  0.294  0.285  0.280  0.295  0.292  0.309 
  reg2      0.296  0.262  0.279  0.234  0.292  0.218  0.292  0.209 
  reg3      0.333  0.275  0.333  0.274  0.298  0.249  0.291  0.229 
  ler      8.47  8.15  8.425  8.135  8.32  8.00  8.38  7.98 
  lur      8.28  8.35  8.295  8.225  8.26  8.21  8.24  8.15 
  lpr      48.75  45.36  48.699  44.919  47.09  43.27  47.76  43.17 
  lrs      7.74  6.18  7.861  6.144  7.41  6.04  7.54  5.93 
 a calculated
 at the onset of individuals’ programme spells (October 31 1994 for non-participants),
 
 b males and females; previous participation in ALMPs possible, 
 c females; previous participation in ALMPs possible, 
 d males and females; no previous participation in ALMPs, 







Table B1. The selection equation. Response period: 6 months. 
  sample 3    sample 4 
  variable    estimate    std.error  marg. eff.    estimate  std.error    marg. eff. 
 constant  -2.204***    0.632 27.61    -1.913*** 0.699  31.90 
 female  0.294***    0.107 4.35           
 age24  0.305**    0.137  5.47    0.311**  0.154    7.13 
  age29  0.137   0.123  2.32    0.129  0.136   2.81 
  age49  0.130   0.130  2.23    0.173  0.147   3.86 
  age59  -0.111  0.168  -1.68    -0.027  0.191  -0.57 
  cit1  -0.194  0.321  -2.76    -0.348  0.335  -6.00 
  cit2  -0.242  0.248  -3.34    -0.442  0.312  -7.20 
  dis  0.151   0.214  2.67    0.104  0.276   2.32 
  ed1  0.150   0.127  2.36    0.192  0.149   3.93 
  ed2  0.024   0.162  0.39    0.027  0.184   0.56 
  exp1  -0.014  0.139  -0.23    -0.132  0.153  -2.72 
  exp2  -0.075  0.136  -1.22    -0.161  0.151  -3.40 
  edspec  0.142   0.101  2.20    0.167  0.117   3.37 
 job1  -0.695***   0.217 -7.14    -0.733*** 0.271  -10.02 
 job2  -0.849***   0.139 -8.52    -0.896*** 0.142  -12.20 
 job3  -0.879***   0.165 -8.28    -0.905*** 0.182  -11.62 
 job4  -0.771**    0.303 -7.37    -0.870*  0.479    -10.73 
 job5  -0.821***    0.235 -7.73    -0.568*  0.331    -8.55 
 job6  -0.771***    0.153 -8.25    -0.723***  0.262    -9.99 
 job7  -0.513***    0.145 -6.30    -0.564***  0.160    -9.08 
 ui  0.080    0.138 1.25    0.053  0.159    1.09 
 ca  -0.152    0.203 -2.24    -0.051  0.242    -1.04 
 move   -0.079    0.124 -1.24    -0.178  0.151    -3.46 
 scat12  0.467***    0.172 9.62    0.289  0.211    6.96 
 ue  0.007    0.005 0.11    0.004  0.006    0.08 
 ueˆ2  0.000    0.000 0.00    0.000  0.000    0.00 
 uet  -0.001    0.002 -0.01    -0.001  0.003    -0.02 
 nue  0.019    0.055 0.31    0.022  0.061    0.48 
 reg1  -0.076    0.167 -1.18    -0.046  0.183    -0.95 
 reg2  -0.011    0.125 -0.17    0.018  0.131    0.38 
 reg3  0.073    0.123  1.20    0.078  0.140    1.68 
 ler  -0.007    0.038 -0.11    -0.014  0.042    -0.30 
 lur  -0.014    0.039 -0.22    -0.006  0.041    -0.12 
 lpr  0.007    0.006 0.11    0.007  0.006    0.15 
 lrs  0.046***    0.014 0.77    0.065***  0.014    1.43 
 log-likelihood  -2519.78     -1499.09 
 goodness of fit    0.080      0.098 
 chi-squared     436.94      324.12 
 no. of observations  3287     1849 
Note: Bivariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. The log-
likelihood refers to the value obtained for the full model, including the parameters of the employment equation and the 
equation for programme effects. The goodness of fit measure is 1-(lnL/lnL0), where lnL0 is the log-likelihood 






Table B2. The employment equation. Response period: 6 months. 
  sample 3    sample 4 
  variable    estimate   std.error  marg.  eff.    estimate   std.error  marg.  eff. 
  constant  0.043   0.240  38.11    0.053   0.414  38.10 
  female  -0.068    0.055  -2.50          
 age24  -0.231***    0.083 -8.26   -0.066    0.117    -2.42 
  age29  0.035    0.069 1.31   0.046    0.092    1.71 
  age49  0.019    0.070 0.68   0.080    0.098    2.99 
  age59  -0.177**  0.080  -6.31    -0.135**  0.067  -4.85 
  cit1  -0.275    0.182 -9.51   -0.098    0.204    -3.55 
 cit2  -0.792***    0.146 -23.11    -1.141***   0.214  -28.85 
 dis  -0.383***    0.149 -12.91    -0.501**    0.235    -16.28 
  ed1  0.158**    0.065 5.76   0.098    0.092    3.61 
 ed2  0.286***    0.086 10.82    0.382***   0.118  14.52 
  exp1  0.035   0.078  1.28    0.252**  0.114   9.41 
 exp2  0.062    0.076  2.28    0.308***   0.112  11.30 
  edspec  0.095*    0.055 3.49   0.107    0.081    3.91 
 job1  -0.409***   0.111 -13.65    -0.627***   0.157  -19.43 
 job2  -0.289***   0.079 -10.05    -0.280***   0.092  -9.78 
 job3  -0.278***    0.087 -9.66    -0.312***   0.111  -10.76 
 job4  0.133    0.149 5.03    -0.068    0.261    -2.46 
 job5  -0.052    0.108 -1.88    -0.020    0.205    -0.74 
 job6  -0.174**    0.084 -6.21    -0.205    0.157    -7.22 
 job7  -0.230**    0.093 -8.11    -0.164    0.113    -5.87 
 ui  -0.074    0.072 -2.75    0.030    0.104    1.12 
 ca  0.167*    0.097 6.31    0.307**    0.148    11.81 
 move   0.061    0.065 2.26    0.080    0.101    3.00 
 scat12  0.103    0.127 3.84    0.243    0.170    9.25 
 ue  -0.010***    0.003 -0.38    -0.017***    0.004    -0.64 
 ueˆ2  0.000***    0.000 0.00    0.000***    0.000    0.01 
 uet  -0.004***    0.001 -0.16    -0.002    0.002    -0.07 
 nue  0.155***    0.032 5.88    0.109**    0.046    4.09 
 reg1  0.000    0.078 0.01    0.159    0.113    6.00 
 reg2  0.005    0.067 0.20    0.175*    0.094    6.53 
 reg3  -0.095    0.076  -3.47    0.065    0.110    2.41 
 ler  -0.014    0.020 -0.52    -0.027    0.031    -0.97 
 lur  -0.028*    0.016 -1.03    -0.048*    0.026    -1.77 
 lpr  0.002    0.004 0.07    -0.005    0.005    -0.17 
 log-likelihood  -1996.53     -1087.85 
 goodness of fit    0.062     0.082 
 chi-squared     264.2     193.90 
 no. of observations   3287     1849 
Note: Univariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. The log-
likelihood refers to the value obtained for the full model, including the parameters of the equation for programme 
effects. The goodness of fit measure is 1-(lnL/lnL0), where lnL0 is the log-likelihood corresponding to a specification 









Table B3. The correlation coefficient; the response period includes time spent in the 
programme. 
   sample 1    sample 2 
   response period    αi = δ’qi  αi = δ0    αi = δ’qi    αi = δ0 
   3 months    -0.036 (0.02)  0.152 (0.76)    -0.043 (0.02)    0.129 (0.40) 
   6 months    0.026 (0.01)  0.146 (0.96)    0.130 (0.26)    0.231 (1.80) 
   12 months    0.415** (4.56)    0.261* (3.26)   0.461* (3.73)    0.299 (2.62) 
   18 months    0.116 (0.28)  0.203 (1.92)    0.047 (0.04)    0.139 (0.64) 
              
   sample 3    sample 4 
   αi = δ’qi  αi = δ0    αi = δ’qi    αi = δ0 
   3 months    0.066 (0.02)    0.148 (0.30)    0.151 (0.12)    0.181 (0.32) 
   6 months    -0.267 (0.32)    0.036 (0.02)    0.278 (0.44)    0.142 (0.22) 
   12 months    -0.183 (0.08)    -0.033 (0.02)    0.432 (1.16)    0.155 (0.26) 
   18 months    -0.441 (1.12)    -0.061 (0.06)    -0.109 (0.08)    -0.052 (1.06) 
 
Note: Bivariate probit model, * significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Chi-square 
test statistics in parentheses. We perform a likelihood ratio test of the restriction ρ=0. The test statistic is  -2(lnLR -
lnLU), where LR is the likelihood corresponding to the model with one linear restriction (ρ=0) and LU the 
likelihood for the unrestricted model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 